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Political Science is Going Ahead 
(By Convoluted Ways) 
A Commentary on Giovanni Sartori
In his reflections on “Where is Political Science Going?,” professor Sartori brightly
points out some present flaws in the disci-
pline: too much empiricism and too little ap-
plied research. At attacking “American-type”
political science, however, I think he chooses
a mistaken enemy. I will hold, in contrast,
that the main source of the mentioned flaws is
the weakness of political theory. 
I am very happy to know that Sartori has
“always maintained that our ‘model’ is eco-
nomics.” I do too, and I do not think there is
much more to choose from in the social sci-
ences. But indeed economics is not a model
to establish political science’s “own identity”
as a “soft science,” as Sartori holds. Econom-
ics is a rather hard science and should be
taken as such, if it were the case, as a model.
Sartori is right that political science has devel-
oped relatively little applied research. This is
reflected in the supply of teaching, with rela-
tively few programs in public policy and ad-
ministration in comparison to programs in po-
litical science, in contrast, for instance, with




ics. But the very ex-
ample of economics
shows that in the so-
cial sciences, as in
all sciences, while
there can be theoretical research and applied
research, the latter without the former is nei-
ther science nor a contribution to cumulative
knowledge or intellectual, material, or moral
progress of human beings. Atheoretical applied
teaching can transmit, at most, certain tools
and skills based on practitioners’ experience
(in business or in electoral campaigns or in
whatever else). But the big expansion of ap-
plied economics and business studies in the
last two or three decades has been successful
thanks to the high level of consistency which
has been achieved in economic theory after a
long trajectory of cumulative knowledge. Po-
litical science as an academic discipline
emerged—as remarked by Sartori—much later
than economics and, logically, it is still at a
relatively backward stage in which theoretical
research on basic questions yet to be solved
tends to dominate. I wish that theoretical re-
search in political science may eventually pro-
duce results at least as consistent as those in
economics and as able to guide the expansion
of applied research at a comparable scale.
by
Josep M. Colomer
Center for Research and
Teaching in Economics (CIDE)
All political scientists should be very grate-
ful to the founders of political science; some
of them (but only some) are mentioned by
Sartori. Without them we would not be here,
that is, doing research and teaching, or writing
or reading this essay. But, as all founders,
those of political science established only cer-
tain foundations of the discipline whose own
development should lead us beyond. As 
Sartori says, the founders’ main task was the
provision of a number of highly relevant “def-
initions” to develop further analysis, to which
I would add a number of “classifications”
(like those of Sartori himself, for instance, on
party systems) which opened the way to start
collecting and making sense of information.
However, scientific progress requires some-
thing else. To be put in a simple framework,
at least four levels of knowledge of whatever
object can be distinguished:
1) Definitions and classifications;
2) Quantitative measurements;
3) Causal hypotheses;
4) Explanatory theory. 
The founding fathers, as acknowledged by
Sartori, stayed basically at the first level: defi-
nitions. What surprises Sartori is that in fur-
ther developments the discipline has reached
the second level, centered on quantitative
measurements. The “ancient sage,” as he him-
self is characterized, is absolutely right at not-
ing that too often “measurement replaces defi-
nitions,” which makes the former useless and
sometimes counterproductive. It is impossible
not to share his dismay at so many statistical
exercises pretending only to modify some of
the variables in a regression model previously
presented by other authors, or to give another
massage to the same data, without even defin-
ing clearly what we are talking about nor con-
sidering hypotheses or theories that could
make sense of the exercise or clarify the rele-
vance of the question. Hundreds of graduate
students and assistant professors have been
and are currently victims of “research pro-
grams” made only of statistical exercises with-
out direction. But perhaps this is a somewhat
inevitable cost derived from the expansion of
available information, since econometrists
have often felt in the same kind of exercise—
and, although I know other fields much less, I
suspect that this may have also affected other
still more “model” sciences like physics or 
experimental biology.
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Certainly the really existing political science—that is, what
political scientists do—is still far away from being a science
in the full sense of the word, including the four components
mentioned above. To achieve the highest level—a satisfactory
political theory—we should start, first, from a precise delimita-
tion of the object, in which politics should not be considered
to be a mere derivation from the economy, social structures,
or culture, but a rational activity to be explained by itself. 
Second, we need a clear definition of human motives in politi-
cal action from which models and explanations of empirical
observations can be derived. Finally, we should adopt a con-
sistent criterion of judgment to evaluate the outcomes of 
political action.
On all this, there have been and there will be multiple opin-
ions, alternatives, and schools of thought. But a clear symptom
of theoretical weakness is that, in contrast to what happens in
economics and other social sciences, in political studies the so-
called classical authors are still placed at the same level as—or
even above—the most advanced contemporary researchers. To
be said in a few words, almost no paper by Machiavelli or
Montesquieu or the other usual members of the sacred list
would be accepted today to be published in academic journals
with anonymous referees. Any person used to reading contem-
porary academic literature should recognize that, when consult-
ing the classics, what we find very often are confusing and
ambiguous statements and arguments—and for this reason sev-
eral generations of scholars still waste their lives trying to as-
certain “what exactly these masters (sometime ago Marx, today
perhaps Nietzsche or Tocqueville) were trying to say.”
I am not going to deny the founding role of some classics
and the interest in reading them today to identify certain fun-
damental questions, as well as conjectures and hypotheses to
be tested, or even possible suggestions to develop research
with current methods. It can also be appropriate to include in
a program of political studies a genealogy of how concepts,
definitions, and hypotheses have been shaped through cen-
turies. But for this to be formative for students the instructor
should show which were the seminal contributions and how, in
contrast, some of the concepts forged by “the classics” are im-
precise, tautological, or hardly fruitful; and how many of their
hypotheses have turned out to be wrong and have been refuted
by experience and subsequent academic studies. The habitude
of identifying “political theory” with the history of ideas is of-
fensive to current political science because, in spite of all the
limitations sketched above, the discipline has forged some
solid theoretical foundations beyond our ancestors’ initial con-
tributions. These include, among other important themes and
subjects: collective action, political parties, electoral systems,
electoral strategies, agenda formation of policy issues, institu-
tional choices, and the meaning of democracy. In this perspec-
tive, it would be much more interesting to include in the list
of classics, for instance, Dahl, Downs, Duverger, Olson, and
Riker—none of whom, by the way, are mentioned by Sartori
among the “founders”—than discussing once more one of
Plato’s footnotes. Of course, the still common identification in
political studies of “theory” with “classics” is strange to all
other social sciences, in none of which such veneration is still
maintained.
I think Sartori fails dramatically in choosing a target when
he identifies “American-type” political science as the enemy to
beat. First, it should be remembered that, according to fine
calculations, about 80% of political science instructors and re-
searchers in the world work in universities and institutions
seated in the United States (although a significant number of
them came from other longitudes). To be isolated from them
would only produce some parochial curiosity. I thus join en-
thusiastically Sartori’s invitation to “visit, to believe, the an-
nual meetings of the American Political Science Association.”
My personal experience as participant in about a dozen of
these meetings over more than 15 years is exactly the opposite
of Sartori’s, since while he says to have experienced “unfading
dullness,” I have found there the best intellectual stimuli and
passion to share ambitious projects. Visit, then, and decide for
yourselves.
Finally, “the alternative” for which Sartori sides attests only
to his well-known sense of humor, because it is nothing else
than “to resist the quantification of the discipline.” If he had
at least desired that quantification were based on clear and
precise definitions and classifications, then I could not agree
more. Then we would be moving from level 1 to level 2 in
my previous sketch. I side on the alternative of moving from
level 1 to level 2, which indeed requires relying on the for-
mer, but also to levels 3 and 4. That is, to follow seriously
the “model” of economics and, in general, of all science, in
the aim of achieving explanatory theory also able to support
applied research. This way we could progress not only in the
knowledge of politics, but also in the likely outcomes of polit-
ical action, to the benefit of the greater satisfaction (or happi-
ness or utility, all of which, as famously stated by one classic,
is the same) of the greater number of citizens.
